tl;dr– From a Bayesian perspective, we can take the Sherlock-Holmes method as being a reasonable approximation so long as inappropriate dismal of initially-improbable possibilities is avoided. This is, when Holmes says that
when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth
, the "whatever remains" must still be significantly more probable than the sum of all initially-excluded possibilities.
Potentially, inappropriate approximation.
The Sherlock-Holmes method,
when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth
can approximately work when used appropriately. Part of this would be not going too far with "however improbable".
The issue's that there're a lot of improbable explanations for stuff: for example, a lot of weird things could be due to time-travelers. But we usually exclude these for being so improbable as to be approximately impossible. Still, if we can show that every other possibility is at least as improbable, then suddenly we have to go back and reconsider including other possible explanations.
For example, let's say that there's a set of possible explanations which we tag with probability-weights:
Potential explanation |
Probability weight |
Possibility 1 |
100 |
Possibility 2 |
95 |
Possibility 3 |
50 |
Possibility 4 |
25 |
[...] |
[...] |
Possibility 100 |
0.1 |
Possibility 101 |
0.05 |
[...] |
[...] |
Possibility 1000 |
0.0000001 |
Possibility 1001 |
0.00000000000000000000001 |
[...] |
[...] |
ZORG, THE AWESOME, TIME TRAVELER FROM THE EMPIRE, did it! |
[very, very low weight] |
[...] |
[...] |
Now suppose that:
the total weight of Possibilities 1 through 1000 is ~270;
the total weight of Possibilities 1001 and above is ~0.000000000000000000000011 (this is, 10% larger than Possibility 1001 alone).
Then, the proposition that the truth is in Possibilities 1 through 1000, rather than anything else, is better than 99.999999999999%. Many folks would then approximate the odds of Possibilities 1001 and beyond as zero.
Now, suppose that further fact-finding can push the odds of all Possibilities 1 through 999 to being less-than 10-100, while Possibility 1000 has also become far less likely, down to less-than 10-25. This is,
Potential explanation |
Probability weight |
Possibility 1 |
< 10-100 |
Possibility 2 |
< 10-100 |
Possibility 3 |
< 10-100 |
Possibility 4 |
< 10-100 |
[...] |
[...] |
Possibility 100 |
< 10-100 |
Possibility 101 |
< 10-100 |
[...] |
[...] |
Possibility 1000 |
10-25 |
Possibility 1001 |
10-23 |
[...] |
[...] |
ZORG, THE AWESOME, TIME TRAVELER FROM THE EMPIRE, did it! |
[very, very low weight] |
[...] |
[...] |
If Sherlock-Holmes was only considering Possibilities 1 through 1000, under the prior argument that it was vastly unlikely for any other to be true, then Holmes would conclude that it's vastly likely for Possibility 1000 to be the case under the same reasoning (because the cumulative weight of Possibilities 1 through 999 is vastly smaller than the weight of Possibility 1000).
And that's the problem with "however improbable": it's not qualified with "so long as it's still sufficiently more probable than the set of all excluded possibilities".
Because, in this case, Possibility 1001 is now the most likely one, with a probability-weight 100 times greater than the conclusion of the Sherlock-Holmes's method, Possibility 1000. But, the Sherlock-Holmes method might fail to realize this because it implicitly excluded Possibility 1001 for being too unlikely at first.
This is, the situation's now:
Possibility set |
Odds |
Possibility 1001 |
~90.1% |
Possibilities 1002 and above |
~9.01% |
Possibility 1000 |
~0.901% |
Possibilities 1 through 999 |
< 10-74 |
, making the conclusion that it must be Possibility 1000 pretty shaky.
Summary: Can't forget to reconsider initially-implausible-seeming possibilities.
When using the Sherlock-Holmes method, an investigator may (reasonably) exclude consideration of possibilities that seem truly unlikely. However, if the investigator then finds that all of the considered possibilities become significantly less likely, they mustn't forget to reconsider the initially-excluded set.
This is, when Holmes says
when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth
, there's a limitation on "however improbable": if it becomes so improbable as to make it less likely than the exclusion-criteria initially used, then the original exclusion of other possibilities would generally need to be reconsidered.
Note: This is still probabilistic.
Appropriately used, the Sherlock-Holmes method could still fail to produce absolute proof of the conclusion. For example, it'd generally fail to exclude the possibility that an invisible-pink-unicorn is using hypnosis to alter investigators' perceptions.
However, it's presumably the case that Holmes would've understood that the method still rested on some probabilistic assumptions, e.g. in deciding the threshold for something being "impossible".