Timothy Williamson in Evidence in Philosophy, chapter 7 section 3 of his book "Philosophy of Philosophy" (2007), conveys the notion of the Judgement Skeptic - e.g. (bold emphasis is mine)
[Judgment] skepticism does not target the distinctive features of perception, memory, testimony, or inference. Rather, it targets our practices of applying concepts in judgment. ... For example, it does not question the existence of an external world to which we are causally related in the ways appropriate to perception – at least, not until the concepts of causation and perception themselves come under scrutiny.
[Judgments skeptics] question our standards for applying ordinary concepts both in experience and in thought: the concept of a mountain, the concept of belief, the concept of knowledge, the concept of possibility, the concept of the counter-factual conditional, and so on. Philosophers tend to call judgments “intuitive” when they are considered as the primary targets of judgment skepticism.
Scenarios for judgment skepticism are often distinctive in attempting to verify the scientific image of the world while falsifying the manifest image, common sense, or what passes for it in our culture.
Like other skeptics, judgments skeptics ask for independent evidence that favors the piece of common sense at issue over their skeptical hypothesis. The “scientific” flavor of their alternative scenario disguises the resemblance to more traditional forms of skepticism.
[J]udgment skeptics often argue that we actually are in their skeptical scenario, for example in which there are no mountains, or no beliefs.
[For judgment skeptics] We can live most of our lives on the basis of a fiction; only when we take a more scientific attitude are we forced to recognize the fiction for what it is... For judgment skeptics, appeals to intuition are nothing more than the last resort of dogmatic conservativism, in its desperate attempt to hold back the forward march of scientific and metaphysical progress.
Question: Daniel Dennett drives to explain Consciousness as an Evolved User-Illusion in chapter 14 of his book "From Bacteria to Bach and Back" (2017) - so does this place him as a judgement skeptic? E.g.
[O]ur first-person point of view of our own minds is not so different from our second-person point of view of others’ minds: we don’t see, or hear, or feel, the complicated neural machinery churning away in our brains but have to settle for an interpreted, digested version, a user-illusion that is so familiar to us that we take it not just for reality but also for the most indubitable and intimately known reality of all. That’s what it is like to be us.
If we, our selves, were all “just” part of each other’s user-illusions, wouldn’t that imply that, really, life has no meaning? No. The manifest image that has been cobbled together by genetic evolutionary processes over billions of years, and by cultural evolutionary processes over thousands of years, is an extremely sophisticated system of helpful metaphorical renderings of the underlying reality uncovered in the scientific image. It is a user-illusion that we are so adept at using that we take it to be unvarnished reality, when in fact it has many coats of intervening interpretive varnish on it. The manifest image composes our Umwelt, the world we live in for almost all human purposes—aside from science.
Updated below 11/04/2022 Tim Williamson's stance is that it is Knowledge is Basic, i.e. he directly opposes the Justified-True-Belief approach to knowledge (that Gettier famously critiqued). For Williamson evidence can be Knowledge in itself, rather than a justification for such, and evidence of our sense feeds empirical knowledge.
Furthermore the distinction between Manifest and Scientific Image employed by Dennett is taken from Wilfred Sellars in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1962/3) pdf - which on page 20 states:
The fact that each theoretical [scientific] image is a construction on a foundation provided by the manifest image, and in this methodological sense pre-supposes the manifest image, makes it tempting to suppose that the manifest image is prior in a substantive sense; that the categories of a theoretical science are logically dependent on categories pertaining to its methodological foundation in the manifest world of sophisticated common sense in such a way that there would be an absurdity in the notion of a world which illustrated its theoretical principles without also illustrating the categories and principles of the manifest world. Yet, when we turn our attention to 'the' scientific image which emerges from the several images proper to the several sciences, we note that although the image is methodologically dependent on the world of sophisticated common sense, and in this sense does not stand on its own feet, yet it purports to be a complete image ...