In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment intended to demonstrate the theoretical impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics, without appealing to accepted assumptions. If it is asked how any given proposition is known to be true, proof in support of that proposition may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of that supporting proof, and any subsequent supporting proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three ways of completing a proof:

• The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition presupposes the truth of that very proposition
• The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
• The dogmatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather than defended

The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options. Karl Popper's suggestion was to accept the trilemma as unsolvable and work with knowledge by way of conjecture and criticism.

Source: Münchhausen trilemma - Wikipedia

Suppose that two persons, X and Y, are asked the same question "why do you believe what you believe?", and for each justification they offer, they are subsequently asked the question "why?".

Suppose also that both X and Y avoid circular arguments and infinite regresses. Thus, their chains of justification (or DAGs, to allow for potential branching in the justification process while avoiding cycles) end up terminating, in one way or another, in dogmatic assumptions.

Considering this, are X and Y equally rational, no matter what dogmatic assumptions they adopt as their stopping points? What if X, for example, decides to adopt theistic dogmatic assumptions, whereas Y decides to adopt naturalistic ones?

Furthermore, suppose that we attempt to break the symmetry between X and Y by adopting a meta-criterion to assess the rationality of their dogmatic assumptions. Wouldn't this meta-criterion also suffer from the same justification issues highlighted by the Münchhausen trilemma? Would we need to come up with meta-dogmas in order to justify our meta-criterion, and meta-meta-criteria to justify those meta-dogmas, and meta-meta-dogmas to justify those meta-meta-criteria, and meta-meta-meta-criteria to justify those meta-meta-dogmas, and so on and so forth ad infinitum?