Irrelevant of people's views on transgenderism, for the purpose of the question please accept, or simulate, that gender identity exists and is analytically and ontologically distinct from sex.

If we agree that:

• Gender identity is accessible through introspection, when people 'out' themselves as being as such it is often known to them beforehand, in at least some cases through entirely their own mind/brain.
• Gender identity cannot be publicly empirically observed (even through neuroscience)

Does this necessarily mean that another, private entity must be responsible for such self-knowledge, aka the mind, so dualism is true? Surely such an identity cannot be explained by physical processes? Or, is this guilty of making what Ryle objected to as the 'Category Mistake'?

For the sake of argument, let us say that gender identity exists and is analytically and ontologically distinct from sex.

Let us also say that:

• Gender identity is accessible through introspection, when people 'out' themselves as being as such it is often known to them beforehand, in at least some cases through entirely their own mind/brain.
• Gender identity cannot be publicly empirically observed (even through neuroscience).

Does this necessarily mean that another, private entity must be responsible for such self-knowledge, i.e. the mind, so dualism is true? Surely such an identity cannot be explained by physical processes? Or am I guilty of making what Ryle objected to as the 'Category Mistake'?