Should viable philosophical theories not always be consistent with science?

Question

One of the phenomena of modern philosophy which has troubled me, particularly in the discussion of analytical metaphysics, is its almost complete disregard for established science. It's as if professors feel as though their own discussions may continue unhindered and unchecked by science; as if science and philosophy are almost mutually exclusive.

For example, I was once sitting in a lecture where, in the course of an overview of various metaphysical theories of the nature of time, the professor accorded them each with equal weight and then mentioned that one had "the advantage" of according with Einstein's Theory of General Relativity. I was stunned. How can an accordance with fact be merely an "advantage"? And, conversely, how can dissonance with facts be merely a "drawback"?

Why is this separation perpetuated? How is any philosophical discussion considered viable when it is contradicted by science? Now, to be clear, I am not advocating for some sort of Positivistic stance. I am, however, advocating for what I see as sanity and relevance in a very important area of philosophical discussion.

Answer 1

How can an accordance with fact be merely an "advantage"? And, conversely, how can dissonance with facts be merely a "drawback"?

I believe part of the reason philosophy has this estranged relationship with science is because science has a tendency to lend itself to phrasings that claim science has truth. As long as science does that, it's hard for philosophy to give credence to theories which are less convenient, scientifically speaking. It needs some space to breathe, so to speak.

You state that relativity is a fact. It is not. Even if we use the scientific definition of the word "fact," the facts are the individual observations we have made about the universe, such as the time delays on GPS satellites. Relativity is a theory. It is a theory which is consistent with most of the facts.

I use that phrasing intentionally. We know there's something to be refined in either relativity or quantum mechanics, because our current understanding of those two theories is incompatible when it comes to gravity. At least one of them will have to be tweaked at some point. Just some food for thought.

Now, you are surprised that agreement with a theory is merely seen as an advantage. You shun a philosophy for failing to align with your preferred theory. Now take that for a moment, and see why you see such an estranged relationship between philosophy and science might come forth.

There's work going on in philosophy all the time. Perhaps the "disadvantaged" theory of the nature of time had some really beneficial attributes, and all it needed was an update to the 21th century. Maybe you'll be the philosopher to take that theory and align it with modern relativistic thinking to create a theory that is consistent with science. The other theory has the advantage that the work is already done for you, but does that mean we should dismiss this theory outright?

Thus, your professor shows both theories, and merely mentions that one has an advantage over the other. The rest is left up to you.

Of course, it doesn't need to be that way. There's plenty of philosophy that is indeed in accord with science. I, myself, love studying how to marry science and philosophy. It's fun. The problem is not philosophy and science, its the people. It's the people talking philosophy and the people talking science. The philosophers don't agree on the nature of man, and the scientists (especially physical ones) tend to distance themselves from social sciences because they're not rigorous enough. So if there's one thing science and philosophy agree on, it's that people are complicated. Thus, I appreciate why people choose to put some distance between their ideas and those who might try to poke holes in their ideas.

Answer 2

It is a good thing that philosophy does not dismiss theories based on science because when science has failed in the past, the rescue has come from philosophical notions at odds with the previous science. If these were not somehow kept alive in at least some historical framework, how would we recycle them?

Consider just one notion: atomism.

It enters the scene very early, then it is entirely dismissed in favor of substances. It is almost entirely quashed by the time Carnot shows that heat can be handled as a subtle substance. (Along the way Kant declares the problem insoluble -- a bizarre tangent.)

But then it comes back in, with statistical mechanics. Yet it contends mightily with field theory, since the fact gravity and electricity spread through open space makes it hard to see how they might be mediated by particles.

It finally triumphs when we get the nuclear theory of matter. But then it is again not quite right, when we reach relativity and discover that all of matter is convertible to and from energy, which is basically a continuous measure and not a compartmentalized one.

But then it is back, with quantum dynamics, since it turns out that the energy has to come in discrete quantities. (I find this reversal most impressive since the previous loss and his win were both first proven by Einstein.)

It is gone again with String Theory, but then back in terms of the Planck length.

At what point in this endless cycle of reverals should we have thrown it out, and declared it to be at odds with science?

Answer 3

Well, its a well-attested fact that philosophers argued against the Newtonian conception of determinism and action at a distance. This was at variance with the agreed upon science at the time. Nevertheless it was later found that QM led to the loss of the first and GR to the loss of the second.

Similarly Smolin, a well-known American physicist, thinks - on philosophical grounds - that time is real. This is at variance with the conception of time inherent in GR. If you want to look up the argument then have a look at his book Time Reborn.

Answer 4

I'd basically agree with your position/argument, but wouldn't totally dismiss (maybe 99% dismiss rather than 100%:) the alternatives. Firstly, regarding ...

How is any philosophical discussion considered viable when it is contradicted by science?

... I'd sharpen "contradicted by science" to "contradicted by observation", where observation means, say, "the reproducible (though maybe only stochastically reproducible) outcome of unambiguous experimental procedures".

But now, even that's arguably debatable re metaphysics. In another post somewhere in this forum, I'd mentioned the ancient Greek epicycle theory of planetary motion. That reproduces observed planetary motion quite, quite well, although its theoretical/metaphysical underpinning that the Sun and (other) planets revolve around the Earth is entirely, entirely wrong.

Indeed, epicycles are in fact a complete set of functions, whereby any curve can be expanded in terms of epicycles upon epicycles, etc. If those Greeks had been somewhat better mathematicians they could've done that, and then said to critics, "Hey, our epicycle results agree with observations to fifteen decimal digits. How could they possibly be wrong???!!! Obviously, the Sun and planets must be revolving around the Earth." So metaphysics must allow for some amount of wiggle room (but maybe not too much) beyond agreement with observations.

Nowadays, for example, we often expand functions in terms of sines and cosines, also complete sets of functions, taking them to be fundamental in some way, and pointing to that same fifteen-decimal-digit-agreement (for quantum electrodynamics where that measurement accuracy is actually possible) as evidence that our theory's correct. Uh, huh. Well, indeed probably so, but leaving that 1% wiggle room might nevertheless be a wise idea.

For example, re general relativity which you cite, there's still no generally-accepted quantum theory of gravity. But what is generally accepted is that when such a theory is formulated, general relativity will just be an approximation to it, accurate in regimes where quantum effects are negligible/ignorable. So how might that more global quantum theory of gravity affect our "metaphysical conception of spacetime" vis-a-vis the conception suggested by relativity? To be determined.

Of course, when predictions of the mathematical formulation of a theory/metaphysical_position are explicitly contradicted by experimental observation, then (as far as I can tell) it's just plain wrong, like you say. But my argument above is that the converse doesn't guarantee "it's just plain right", which I take you to also be implying. (That is, your unsharp word "science", which includes theory, in the above quote maybe implies that. Had you initially sharpened it to "observation", then probably not.)

Answer 5

its almost complete disregard for established science

You might very much equally ask, why do scientists disregard philosophy, even as it directly relates to their subject? Scientists like Pinker, Hawking and Dawkins, go way beyond their subject, without the background knowledge to make real sense of what positions they take up philosophically.

There is no excuse for the failing to understand the wider field, for either side. But there is a great difference in temperament, that makes it unusual for thinkers to cross and excel on, both sides divide.

How is any philosophical discussion considered viable when it is contradicted by science?

There is a bigger picture here. Philosophy can go way beyond evidence, and observables. There may be a demon, no less powerful than deceptive, trying to give us a false picture - and that 17th C. thought experiment comes back as the simulation hypothesis, and may find it's way into physics through the peer-to-peer reality model.

Hume's problem of induction, highlights that science facts can only ever be patterns; theories go beyond facts, and as soon as the facts change, and we cannot have any evidence they won't except experience, the theory must go out the window. Science is built on a thicket of assumptions, and it works brilliantly - but as the rise of quantum mechanics showed, even fundamental assumptions change.

Consciousness is a great example of an area where we need science and philosophy to work actively together. We need them to inform each other.