I was reading E. T. Jaynes' Confidence Intervals vs Bayesian Intervals (available here), and I came across this statement regarding Boole's The Laws of Thought:
Boole's own work on probability theory... contains ludicrous errors... See his Example 6, page 286, where by a confusion of propositions [taking the probability of the proposition: 'If X is true, Y is true' as the conditional p(Y|X)] he arrives at the conclusion that two propositions with the same truth value can have different probabilities. He not only fails to see the absurdity of this...
(the relevant section can be found here on page 228).
At first glance, I didn't understand the mistake Jaynes was referring to, but now I think it has to do with the ambiguity of saying 'the probability of if A then B'. This could either be the P(B|A) or the P(A→B), the second of which is equivalent to P(¬A ∨ B). Clearly, these probabilities are not the same, and it is easy to imagine an example case for yourself.
Boole's Mistake:
- 'if A then B' is equivalent to '¬A ∨ B'
- the probability of 'if A then B' is P(B|A)
The problem is that for (1) and (2) to be individually correct, then 'if A then B' refers to different things in each. In (1), 'if A then B' refers to the material implication. In (2), 'if A then B' refers to (B) conditioned on (A) happening.
Is my interpretation correct? Does it even make sense to talk about material implication and Bayesian conditional probabilities in the same breath?