0

Are there any notions of what one should or ought to believe given a certain piece of evidence?

For example, if I hear a noise outside the window, should I now update my credence in there being a murderer outside my house, even if this update is very insignificant? Or should I not?

Should I even represent beliefs as degrees or should they be ternary? (I.e. belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief)

Improve this question
7
  • You should update your beliefs or credence in them when you have good reason to do so.
    – Scott Rowe
    Commented Jun 23 at 12:40
  • Epistemic soundness is a value. Whatever moral system you are considering, one ought to do what the system values. However depending on the system epistemic soundness will be considered more or less important. Cults value adhesion to the group's belief more than evidence, and members who follow evidence against the dogma are usually admonished, rejected and shunned. Maybe "what are the moral systems that say we ought to follow evidence?" or "do we ought to follow evidence in moral system X?" would be better formulations for your question.
    – armand
    Commented Jun 23 at 14:16
  • Try putting ifs after your oughts.
    – g s
    Commented Jun 23 at 15:26
  • Arguably, there are oughts relating to how you form your beliefs, how you update them, and how strongly you adhere to them. This is the subject of virtue epsistemology. But the question of what subjects you choose to form beliefs about is interest-relative.
    – Bumble
    Commented Jun 23 at 16:27
  • 1
    isn't this a duplicate of a lot of questions (maybe from the same user)?
    – user71399
    Commented Jun 23 at 21:57

2 Answers 2

Reset to default
1

Unfortunately, no -- and at several levels.

Even if we assume a fixed set of background assumptions, the field of statistics shows that a Bayesian vs frequentist vs likelihood frameworks can give different answers to "what ought we to infer from the data?"

Stepping back, we have the Duhem-Quine Thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories, so even if we all adhered to the same inferential framework and priors, we'd still be forced to decide what hypotheses to keep vs modify in cases where we have dis-confirmatory evidence.

So, there is no strict sense of "ought" in inference. However, there is "common sense" inference of the kind used in legal discussions, where we do actually try to argue what you ought to have concluded in a particular situation (e.g., negligence claims, tort law, malpractice etc).

Improve this answer
13
  • Bayesian and frequentist frameworks can also give the same answers to "what ought we to infer from the data", in which case that might justify an "epistemic ought"? Note when Bayesian and frequentist answers differ, it is often because they are answering subtly different questions (due to the frequentist definition of probability being limited to things that can have a long run frequency), although the difference is often ignored (often leading to misunderstanding).
    – user6527
    Commented Jun 27 at 6:29
  • 1
    @DikranMarsupial - not really, even the asymptotic guarantees of convergence doesn't get us to ought. Frequentists select p-values, bayesians posterior credibilites and priors. IF they happen to agree then I think we'd have a happy situation where a Frequentist and Bayesian would both say we ought to infer something. But as my second paragraph shows, even if statisticians all agreed on oughts for every hypothesis test, we'd still be stuck in theoretical underdetermination .. empiricism and certainty don't go together unfortunately..
    – Annika
    Commented Jun 27 at 20:02
  • I wasn't referring to asymptotic guarantees. p-values and posterior probabilities are not answers to the same question, rather like credible intervals and confidence intervals do not describe quite the same things, even though they are often treated as if they were (causing no end of statistical mistakes). The point I was making was that Bayesians and frequentists disagreeing does not rule out epistemic oughts - I wasn't making a comment about Quine-Duhem part.
    – user6527
    Commented Jun 27 at 21:31
  • "empiricism and certainty don't go together unfortunately" I completely agree with that - it definitely agrees with my experience! ;o)
    – user6527
    Commented Jun 27 at 21:31
  • Just to clarify, frequentists cannot assign a probability to the truth of a proposition, so with a frequentist null hypothesis test there is no mathematical/logical connection between the p-value and the probability that the null hypothesis is false. Which is why we just "reject the null hypothesis" or "fail to reject the null hypothesis". There is no basis for an "ought" for what we infer about the truth of the hypothesis. There is for a Bayesian test as we have directly made a statement about the plausibility of the hypothesis under a set of assumptions and some evidence.
    – user6527
    Commented Jun 27 at 21:36
-1

There is nothing special about epistemics regarding whether oughts can exist. Whatever theory one uses to generally determine oughts would apply equally to oughts relating to beliefs.

So yes, epistemic oughts do exist, and differ between moral systems.

Improve this answer
1
  • 1
    your answer, whether or not it coheres with my own opinions on the matter, is in stark need of citing a philosopher
    – user71399
    Commented Jun 23 at 21:56

You must log in to answer this question.

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged .