So Aristotle rejects Plato's forms, and replaces it with another kind of form which is solely in the particular.

eg: The red table has a form of redness which is particular to the table. The red apple has a form of redness which is particular to the apple.

But if this is the case, how are we able to say the apple and table have the same or similar colors?

The way I understand it, one purpose of Plato's forms was to allow us to perform this kind of comparison. ie: There is something in common between the apple and table. They are 'interacting' with the same form of 'red'. Without Plato's 'independent form' how is this comparison done (or should it just not be done)?

Aristotle's form rests in the particular, so according to Aristotle, are we mistaken when we think that there's a common redness between the red apple and red table? ie: even using the same term 'red' is misleading?

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    Aristotle thinks of particulars on the model of quivers with arrows, except the arrows cannot be separated from the quivers other than intellectually. Red is one of the arrows, and it is identical for the apple and the table, aspect identity does not require any sharing. In modern terms, Plato's forms are substances and Aristsotle's forms are properties ("common natures" in medieval terminology).
    – Conifold
    Jun 6 at 4:13

Aristotle's hylomorphic forms attribute to a thing while for Plato various things participate in Forms according to reference here:

These criticisms were later emphasized by Aristotle in rejecting an independently existing world of Forms... But exactly how is a Form like the day in being everywhere at once? The solution calls for a distinct form, in which the particular instances, which are not identical to the form, participate; i.e., the form is shared out somehow like the day to many places.

So for Aristotle the form especially his substantial form is a necessary attribution of a substance and the same form doesn't exist outside of the substance in some imagined independent realm or pure mind. So form is like an instantiated token instance for Aristotle while Plato's Form is like a universal type. For Aristotle both red table and red apple have redness tokens, as you rightly conceived, they're still two different tokens thus in terms of color they only resemble each other due to each instantiating an imperfect redness token but not sharing a common token instance strictly speaking. For Aristotle the form is innate as substance's material nature, so we can perceive them with our senses, if forms reside independently our human senses may not perceive them.

  • Hmmm... I'm still not understanding. If we're able to call them both "redness" tokens, then there is some 'redness' in common. Even if it's not a platonic form, it's there at least in our minds. Aristotle must have accounted for this somehow. Jun 5 at 23:58
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    @Ammeet Sharma for Aristotle due to his pragmatism there’s no ideal perfect redness type, so the redness tokens above is only by convention to politely agree with others the table and apple both have some thing common called “redness”, but in reality there’s really none. So the instantiated tokens are just a convenient trope without ontic commitment, while for Plato it’s much more serious even than the matter of tables and apples. Bottom up vs top down which is real kind of metaphysical difference. Jun 6 at 0:12

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