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To elaborate on my question:

To argue that a good will is the only thing that is good without limitation, Kant must argue that all other good things are not good without limitation. To do this, doesn't he need to assume that these things can indeed be good in some limited ways without a good will? Otherwise it seems that they can't even fit under the category of good things, and therefore Kant cannot move on to arguing that as good things, they are not good without limitation.

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  • Did you read the Groundwork, from which these arguments are? He explicitly explains for several "classical" contenders of what may be considered good how "only with limitations" means "can be not good if not accompanied by a good will".
    – Philip Klöcking ♦
    Commented Oct 17, 2021 at 19:28
  • Kant does not need to assume that some things are good in limited ways, only that some things can be made good by the right motive (so are potentially good, to use Aristotle's term). "The single determining factor of whether an action is morally right is the will, or motive of the person doing it." Good will is good absolutely, while everything else is only good derivatively.
    – Conifold
    Commented Oct 17, 2021 at 20:23
  • ... yes, I did read the Groundwork. I was just confused by what he says about gifts of nature. He says that they are "no doubt in many respects good", but can also be "extremely evil and harmful" if made used by a bad will. It sounds like they can still be good in their own limited ways (e.g. for their good effects), but can be bad if (e.g.) they are used by a person of bad will. Since they can be sometimes good and sometimes bad, they are not good without limitation.
    – part-two
    Commented Oct 17, 2021 at 20:45
  • @Conifold Does he need that assumption for his argument at 4:393-4? There, it seems that he's only arguing for the unconditional/absolute value of a good will by arguing that all other good things have conditional/relative value. In other words, if one can show that there are things that cannot be made good by the right motive (e.g. because of other necessary conditions), would that undermine his claim that a good will is the only thing that is good without limitation?
    – part-two
    Commented Oct 17, 2021 at 20:53
  • Why would it? Just because A is the only thing that can make things B does not mean that any thing can be made B. Some things may not be able to become B at all, even with A, the thesis is that those that are need A to do it.
    – Conifold
    Commented Oct 17, 2021 at 20:59

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