Kant is well known for taking seriously the lack of justification for induction voiced by Hume and finding what is left for us to be able to know and believe. I wonder, with the knowledge that the same lack of justification holds for deduction (see: Haack, S. (1976). The justification of deduction. Mind, 85(337), 112-119.), whether there has been any philosopher (perhaps a neo-Kantian) that undertook something similar to Kant with this added lack of justification.
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what is believed can be anything, since belief may be based on anything. What can be known, is that which is the result of neither induction nor deduction, eg direct experience– Nikos M.Commented Oct 31, 2021 at 17:01
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Regarding belief I would like to highlight an important distinction that there would be between what we can believe (anything) versus what we should believe (eg we should believe our selves to be free according to Kant), your answer as I read it now pertains to the first type of believing. Regarding that which is the result of neither induction nor deduction, I wonder if that implies that all that can be known must always be descriptive. This sounds like a very great concession. Is there a good philosopher to read regarding this? From the little I know of Husserl, he comes to mind.– Kniera HoofdCommented Oct 31, 2021 at 17:51
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Haack herself is a follower of C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism who introduced fallibilism about knowledge. The pragmatic solution is to relax the impossibly high standard of justification that Plato, Kant and other classics presumed, and focus on the kind of justification we find suitable and sufficient in our human activities. If we are in good health and see a tree in front of us we take ourselves to know that there is a tree there. We are fallible, it could be otherwise, but fallible knowledge is better than no knowledge at all.– ConifoldCommented Nov 1, 2021 at 6:02
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Thank you, I will look more into pragmatism and fallibilism. This does seem like the necessary point toward which it must turn, but also feels dissatisfying in a way.– Kniera HoofdCommented Nov 2, 2021 at 20:41
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@Conifold Kant is a fallibilist. Peirce even acknowledges him as a direct precursor to pragmatism, so it's surprising that you draw the contrast this way.– user73173Commented Mar 26 at 13:18
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