There are numerous variations of the argument from contingency that that are postulated in apologetics and philosophical speculation, however I stumbled upon an argument that is ascribed to my knowledge to Avicenna, also known as Ibn Sina (though, I may wrong) that posits a unique cosmological argument from contingency, that concludes with a necessary being who may or may not be God, as defined by classical theism. The argument in syllogism goes as follows:
P1. If the set of all contingents is contingent, then a necessary being exists.
P2. The set of all contingents is contingent.
C.Therefore, a necessary being exists.
The argument is valid, as the premises logically necessitate the conclusion, however the soundness of each premise is difficult to reason out of. Premise 1 however, seems to be the least unequivocal, that would likely call for further argumentation.
Likewise, in discourse with proponents of the contingency arguments, I've noticed two distinct forms of logical argumentation for this precise Avicennian argument from contingency. There is one that argues from causation, asserting that a set of contingent members is either externally or inherently caused. If the opponent chooses an inherent cause, then the proponent accuses of a contradiction in terms, because the members of a set being contingent (possibility of non-existence) while the set itself being necessary (impossibility of non-existence) is not metaphysically tenable. I suppose where proponents derive such an objection comes from 1) presupposing Premise 2 that if the members of a set are contingent then that necessitates the set itself to be contingent (I doubt this premise) and 2) a necessary being is by definition a being that causes itself, hence when the opponent affirms a self-causing set of contingent members, the proponent sees this as unwarranted (because a set cannot be both necessary and contingent) I do not really know how to respond to this argumentation
Secondly, if the opponent picks an external cause, then the proponent will proceed to ask if this external cause is necessary or contingent. If the opponent picks necessary, then they have just admitted that there is a necessary being that caused the set of contingent beings. While this may not be God as defined in classical theism, the proponents will rejoice that they have have brought you closer to theism, and for them this is sufficient. However, if this opponent chooses contingent, then the proponent will declare a logical fallacy, because the set includes all contingent things, that would of course, rationally include the external cause that is contingent, therefore the only option is a necessary being that causes the set of contingent members.
Also how would this argument be affected if this set of contingent members was infinite? I really want to see an answer for this.
The second form of argumentation utilizes the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but this post is becoming rather long, so I'll simply leave it to the audience and makes another post sometime later. Thanks for reading this over, I'm keen on reading your responses!