I was reading Aristotle's Metaphysics, and I'm stumped on this passage:
Yet the acquisition of it [wisdom, knowledge of first causes and principles] must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about self-moving marionettes, or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side; for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable.
It's the last paragraph of Part 2 in Book I.
Translation from this link: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html
Earlier on, he mentioned that men begin to search for such knowledge out of wonder and puzzlement. Is he saying that the end of the "original inquiries" ends in certainty, which would be the opposite of puzzlement?