I understand the general view presented by Sellars in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". Yet, I can't get rigorously convinced. The main point is shown in part XIII, specifically in section 35. Is there a way to present a step by step, clear explanation of the fact that in order to notice a sense impression we must have a concept of it, and not the opposite?
To clarify my question: a Thermometer can report "it's 50 degrees now", yet it will only be a responsive disposition, and not an epistemological fact. A person, according to Sellars, in order to report a fact, has also to "play the game of giving and asking for reasons" (as Brandom puts it).
Now, my question is this: I can say, as the empiricists say, that a person senses a red colour, non-inferentially, and translates it (somehow) to a natural kind concept - "red". Sellars, on the other hand cannot accept it. For him, I can notice that I'm in presence of red colour only after I already have the concept "red".
I can try to justify his view saying that the game of giving and asking for reasons is closed for propositional contents only, and hence, sensations cannot take part in it. But it seems like he tries to say the same thing but in a more rigorous way. He claims that a sentence needs to have an authority in order to take part in the game, and therefore the concept "red" comes before the red sensation. This step is the step I don't understand.
Why does the mere responsive disposition report "this is red" (the thermometer report) not have authority, and how does having authority work inhelp to prove the main argument?
I'm looking for a convincing, clear and rigorous argument.
