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By being the dual Prime Mover and Prime Finalizer(?) of substantial reality, isn't Aristotle's God like an immanent version of Plato's transcendent auto to agathon? I just realized, after quite a long while, why Aristotle took individual full objects as primary substances, for a proper substance is balanced between the power of efficient and final causality from either direction in time, and so it is major objects, not flickering particles of quasi-nothingness (which he effectively denied vs. his plenary thesis), that would be the primary subjects of predication, because they would be subject to the more specific predicates of both efficient and final causality (and not just the general teleology imputable even to the ever-divisible synechism of the Aristotelian continuum).E

But then Aristotle's God is the ultimate substance, is It not? The ultimate primary subject. Is this only less mystical than Plato in the sense that Plato seems to have left some room for intuitive apprehension of his ultimate ideal, while Aristotle deferred to mere abstract reason here (or rather the agent intellect, I guess)?

EMy assumption is that the architecture of phronesis is a reflection of the architecture of physical things, on Aristotle's conception. So just as virtue is primarily found in a kind of balance of weak or unstable extremes, then the primacy of primary substances is found in a causal balance. The limit case is the maximum (resp. minimum) of both opposed causalities together, which is therefore balanced in a different, and eternal, way. See e.g. the description of Aristotle's God in the IEP entry on Western concepts of God:

God, the highest being (though not a loving being), engages in perfect contemplation of the most worthy object, which is himself. He is thus unaware of the world and cares nothing for it, being an unmoved mover. God as pure form is wholly immaterial, and as perfect he is unchanging since he cannot become more perfect. This perfect and immutable God is therefore the apex of being and knowledge. God must be eternal. That is because time is eternal, and since there can be no time without change, change must be eternal. And for change to be eternal the cause of change-the unmoved mover-must also be eternal. To be eternal God must also be immaterial since only immaterial things are immune from change. Additionally, as an immaterial being, God is not extended in space.

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    I note with chagrin that questions about philosophy must be forthwith closed (3 VTC as of now)
    – Rushi
    Commented Oct 8 at 3:43
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    See an interesting discussion by Broadie. She challenges the idea that contemplation is Prime Mover's mode of being, and notes that it is the substance of motion but "not in such a way as to be subject, itself, of predicates like 'revolving' and 'fast'." Its efficient causing is subordinate to being the final cause, not balanced with it, "something good - indeed, supremely good - is the ground of order in the universe, principally by being source of the eternal emotion... causes eternal motion by being an object of love or desire."
    – Conifold
    Commented Oct 8 at 10:06
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    It is true that the Prime Mover takes on the metaphysical role of Plato's Highest Good, complete with its ethical overtones, but Aristotle does not rely on pure abstract reason in fleshing it out. He goes out of his way to give us some intuitive grasp of PM's noetic activity. Indeed, the contemplation aspect comes from analogizing it to the best we can have: "And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure... and contemplation is what is most pleasant and best."
    – Conifold
    Commented Oct 8 at 10:26
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    I would really be interested in why people vote to close this? This is clearly an interesting question about (the history of) philosophy, isn't it? I mean what is more in the purview of P. than Aristotle? Nobody is claiming that anything he wrote is overly correct, but nevertheless. Nobody says it better than Wikipedia: The philosopher Bertrand Russell claims that "almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine". That sure is high praise!
    – AnoE
    Commented Oct 8 at 11:42
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    OK @Rushi, I understand the sentiment in that answer you linked, but the most top-voted answer in that meta is that Philosopy.SE is for clear, singular questions, with responses in the form of answers, nothing more or less. This question by Kristian is clear and singular, and clearly on topic. The "what questions to ask" help page for P.SE has amongst others history of philosophy — the domains and personalities in the past associated with philosophy. I have never heard that questions about the history of philosophy (or historical philosophers) are off-topic here...?
    – AnoE
    Commented Oct 8 at 16:10

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I do not think that is correct to regard Aristotle's God as "mystical"; it is metaphysical (and not theological in the Medieval sense: the catalog of A's works has no Theology entry).

Metaphysics is the research about substance qua substance and God is necessary according to Aristotle in order to avoid an infinite regress: since reality is subject to generation and corruption and therefore cannot cause itself, there must exist a principle in order for reality to exist. This principle is God.

See Met, Bk XII (Lambda):

"[1072a] And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is a mover which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same."

"But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. [...] The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle. The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle. [...] We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God."

God is the unmoved mover that stops infinite regress: because God exists, the world exists.

Yet, this “god” - although unique - need not be thought in terms of Christian and other monotheistic religions; he is not a "person" that loves and hates and cares about the world, which is not a God's "creature".

But A's views were relevant to subsequent Jewish, Christian and Islamic theologians in the Middle Ages because they found that A's metaphysical vocabulary of being was suitable for speaking about God. See R.M.Olson, Aristotle on God: Divine Nous as Unmoved Mover.

See also Aristotle on Religion for A's views concerning religion of his own time (that was quite far from being monotheistic).

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  • How anachronistic would it be it be to adapt Kant's concept of intellectual intuition to Aristotle's agent intellect? I might be thinking that "intuition of the divine" is mystical, but then this is not what Aristotle appeals to, even if he attributes divine intuition to his deity. (There is intuition on God's end, but not on ours, then?)
    – Kristian Berry
    Commented Oct 8 at 12:57

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