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Question

The argument seems to say just as I have a physical initial value problem and with the laws of physics tell the time evolution, similarly, I can have an initial value problem of experience and with the different time evolution laws tell you one of the possible experience states one will inhabit in the future.

I don't know what the below argument is known as. And forgive my ignorance for being unaware of the assumptions it makes (I happen to have physics training not philosophy).

Could someone could tell me the name of the argument (if it exists) and the assumptions it makes?

Argument

Let us look at the mappings between the physical configurations of the brain (assume classical mechanics suffices) and the experience state both at a particular point of time (t=0) :

Assume someone is zapping your brain with an electrode to evoke a sensation. Then we can map that physical configuration of the brain (let us call this A) to the sensation one is having (A’)

enter image description here

Now let’s assume I increase the current by one electron then we have a new brain configuration (B) . Is the brain sensitive to this change? No. Then even B maps to A’. We have many-to-one mapping! enter image description here

The Time Evolution

The brain configuration has a one-to-one mapping for each brain configuration at t= 0 with the brain configuration at say t = 1 as a function of the environment. This is a consequence of the laws of physics being equivalent to initial value problems

enter image description here

A different environment will give rise to a different brain configuration at time t = 1. Using this we can map back to experience state and thus get a mapping of the time evolution of the experience state. enter image description here

Thus we having a many to one mapping of experience (in the sense given the information I know what I am experiencing at time t = 0 then at time t =1 I either E’ or F’) enter image description here

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    I'm sorry More, I don't understand the question.
    – Scott Rowe
    Commented May 19, 2022 at 13:43
  • @ScottRowe can you articulate which part is problematic? It would help me fix that part? Commented May 19, 2022 at 13:59
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    This sounds the famous epiphenomenalism (a form of property dualism) in philosophy of mind... Commented May 19, 2022 at 23:57
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    @DoubleKnot thanks this is helpful. Would the epiphenomenalist say that the "experience" of death is unique or constant with time? While under my model say one experiences X post death then depending on the law one obtains a logical possibility would be X to Y as well instead of X to X Commented May 20, 2022 at 4:18
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    There's no logical inconsistency I can spot from your above metaphysical speculation of death under epiphenomenalism. Indeed, this could be some "evidence" support for the perennial afterlife heaven/hell depictions and physical strange anecdotes especially in many religions, though many of them perhaps arrived at similar conclusion via other routes such as idealism... A relevant book from my mind could be the old classic Buddhism FILIAL PIETY SUTRA where I remember talked in detail about bodies after death and their experiences... Commented May 20, 2022 at 4:51

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