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The third man argument says that for every form that resides over some group of things, there will have to be another form that can account for that group and the form. Necessitating an infinitude of any individual form.

But the reason I could never understand it is this: doesn't the form already account for itself? That is, the form is what is common to the group of particulars and itself, and there doesn't need to be another form to account for their commonality.

For example, if I made a factory that creates plush toys that resemble me, we would say that I constitute the character common to them. But I also constitute that character by being myself. So to the question of "what constitutes the character common to me an my plushies?" Isn't the answer simply "me"?

Why can't this same logic apply to forms?

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  • Frances[96] is worth looking into!
    – Kristian Berry
    Commented Nov 15, 2023 at 0:10
  • 2
    Does this answer your question? Why is the third man argument seen as so decisive?
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 5, 2023 at 7:48
  • I looked at this post when I made it, I didn't understand it, but now I seem to understand it, I'm a beginner in philosophy, so forgive me if I end up saying something stupid here, let's go: z, x and y are beautiful by virtue of being part of b1 b1, cannot participate in itself, because the things that participate in the forms must be distinct from it, b1 being distinct from b1 would be illogical, moreover, it would be imperfect, because what implies the perfection of the forms is that they don't need to participate in anything
    – Leandro Tada
    Commented Dec 7, 2023 at 0:34
  • However, just as z, x and y are beautiful, b1 is also beautiful, so we have a new group of beautiful things, z, x, y and b1 But then if b1 cannot participate in itself, then it participates in another form of beauty, which is b2, but b2 is also beautiful, so it needs to participate in b3 and so on...
    – Leandro Tada
    Commented Dec 7, 2023 at 0:35
  • Well then, I think that my objection in the example of the child factory wouldn't be valid because, unlike the forms, I'm not perfect, so there's no problem in me participating in myself, and also what participates in me doesn't necessarily have to be distinct from me (so I can participate in myself). Something I still don't quite understand is why the things that participate in the forms must necessarily be distinct from it? what's wrong with a form participating in itself, being itself and therefore equal?
    – Leandro Tada
    Commented Dec 7, 2023 at 0:35

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Since man tends to categorize knowledge as pyramidal, he needs the third man argument. In a decentralized hierarchy of information, this is never the case. As for your question: if you have a benign multiple personality or an enhanced multiple self, you skip the third man argument.

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