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In Logic of Sense, Deleuze asserted:

  • Neither active or passive, univocal being is neutral.

But in Difference and Repetition,(LS,180) he puts advance of spinoza than Scotus as:

  • Instead of understanding univocal being as neutral or indifferent, he makes it an object of pure affirmation.(DR, 40)

Yes, it's not direct confliction in those propostions above, but when Deleuze assert the later, he dismiss Scotus' position by showing its univocal being is neutral, not only that the univocal being is an object of neturalization. So this confliction can be transformed as follows:

  • P1: Univocal being is neutral.
  • P2: Univocal being is deficient, if it is neutral.

How to mitigate this confliction?

UPDATE: After I reread the Ch.5 in Nietszche an Philosophy, I met another contradition.In NP, Deleuze said:

  1. Affirmation is not a function of being.
  2. Being is not the object of affirmation.
  3. Affirmation is being, being is affirmation in all its power.

But consider those I mentioned above: (A) Being is neutral (LS) (B) Being is (supposed to be) the object of affirmation in its purest form (DR) It appears that 1 seems to contradict 2, (A) contradicts 3, and (B) contradicts 2.

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  • > How to mitigate this confliction? Give up Deleuze. Read 'his' chapter on Sokal & Bricmont's "Intellectual impostures"/"Fashionable nonsense" if you need more evidence to do so
    – ac15
    Commented Mar 29 at 15:21
  • 2
    This may simply due to his change of views since Difference and Repetition is his later work after about 5 years emphasizing Spinoza's positively affirmative univalence designation of univocal being as a way to contrast it with Scotus' completely neutral understanding of the same. Hermeneutically the context of P1 is that which belongs to logic which is naturally neutral while the context of P2 is that which belongs to meta...
    – Double Knot
    Commented Mar 29 at 18:19

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Consider p and q as follows:
p: The univocal being is neutral;
q: the univocal being itself is affirmed;
Then I conceived Three kinds of solutions.

  1. Make p a first-order proposition and q a second-order proposition. Suppose a proposition about proper univocity, call it u: Being is univocal.
    Then p: the univocal is neutral;
    And q: u is affirmed.
    So q is equivalent to u, p implies u, which follows p implies q;

  2. Distinguish between Univocity (univocal sense) of being and univocal Being.
    Then, p should be read as: univocal being is neutral;
    q should be read as: univocal sense of being is affirmed.

  3. Neutrality does not mean the same in two places:
    (1) in DR, the opposite of neutrality is affirmative and negative, which is the qualities of the will to power; In LS, the opposite of neutrality is active and passive, which are qualities of force; Or,
    (2) Being is neutral, not because being is neutral, but because sense itself is neutral.

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  • But it's still very hard for me to feel satisfied with this response
    – Kang
    Commented Mar 29 at 19:18

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