Deleuze picks up the concept of multiplicity from Riemann and Bergson and develops it in many of his works and in a variety of ways. In general, he rejects the One-Many dialectic and proposes multiplicity instead:
[M]ultiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the
one, but rather an organisation belonging to the many as such, which
has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system. The one and
the many are concepts of the understanding which make up the overly
loose mesh of a distorted dialectic which proceeds by opposition.
(Deleuze 1994, p. 182)
Substance theory from Aristotle to Spinoza operates freely with the One-Many dyad (e.g. monism reduces the variety of things in the world to the unity of one). Deleuze opposes this and that is why it can be said that his metaphysics replaces substance with multiplicity:
'Multiplicity', which replaces the one no less than the multiple, is
the true substantive, substance itself. ... Even the many is a
multiplicity; even the one is a multiplicity. ... Everywhere the
differences between multiplicities and the differences within
multiplicities replace schematic and crude oppositions. ... Instead of
the enormous opposition between the one and the many, there is only
the variety of multiplicity - in other words, difference.
(Deleuze 1994, p. 182)
In Anti-Oedipus the concept of multiplicity is directly related to desiring-production (which, in turn, is directly related to the notions of desiring machines and flows):
It is only the category of multiplicity, used as a substantive and
going beyond both the One and the many, beyond the predicative
relation of the One and the many, that can account for
desiring-production: desiring-production is pure multiplicity, that is
to say, an affirmation that is irreducible to any sort of unity.
(Deleuze 1983, p. 42)
References:
Deleuze, G. (1983). Anti-Oedipus : capitalism and schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition. New York: Columbia University Press.