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So, basically, I think Aquinas can prove effectively that there should be a first mover. Here, I'm refering to the First Way, more specifically, for I was reading Feser's book, from which the question I'm going to ask came, but I do think this argument works for any of Aquinas' Ways.

The thing is, I have the following question: how can he prove that a first mover should be necessarily not only unmoved, but also unmovable? For if it's movable, then it has potentiality, and if it does, then it's not pure act. I mean, I do assume Aquinas was right in saying that nothing made the first mover come to exist; in fact, it doesn't have a mover himself, but only before it created other things. This does lead us to the conclusion that there wasn't potentiality in Aquinas' first mover's existence, for it was actually act (precisely because he's the first in the causal order). But even though this proves – let's assume it does, at least for now – there should be a first mover whose existence wasn't a potentiality made act, but was already act, it doesn't prove it (the mover) doesn't have any potential, nor does it prove that after creating things, it couldn't be putting towards movement by them.

Consider a father. Obviously, his son just exists because his father was his efficient cause. But this doesn't mean that, because the father was such a cause here, the product of this act can't actualize his potentials, for even though for exist, the son pressupposed the father, as soon as the son was created, turns out it could actualize the father by himself, since he already exists. I'd think the same should apply to the second cause, for if it exists, then it should have the logical right of possibly actualizing what caused it (the first mover). This, obviously, would mean the mover isn't pure act at all. An external act would be actualizing its potentials.

How does Aquinas answer to this? How can he prove that, as soon as a second cause exists (due to the first mover, it's true), this second cause can't actualize any potential in the first? He should prove it because the opposite would mean this first cause isn't pure act at all, therefore, not God. Thanks in advance.

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  • 1
    You are using the word "actualize" in ways that leave me unsure what you mean by it; can you be more specific about that? Anyway, no, there is no necessity for a first cause. Nothing logically prevents the universe from being any mathematical object we can imagine, and we can imagine mathematical objects without first causes that extend infinitely in both directions in time, or for which time forms a closed loop. Indeed we can imagine mathematical objects without causes at all.
    – causative ♦
    Commented Jul 28 at 4:35
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    @causative Actualize, here, would be the metaphysical act of bringing a potential into act. Turning a ball that is green, but has the potential of becoming red, actually red by painting it, for example. About the second part: yes, we can image anything without causes. This doesn't mean 1) we didn't get these concepts from empirical reality in the first place; 2) something can exist outside of our intellect without being generated for something. Also, if it wasn't generated, it would have always existed. If it did, there would be no present, since it would require an infinite time to pass.
    – Choi
    Commented Jul 28 at 5:34
  • Then how does a son "actualize" his father, or a second cause "actualize" a first cause? Do you actualize a potential or do you actualize an entity? It seems like you're using "actualize" when you mean "affect." About (2) I feel like you didn't hear me about time being a closed loop. If time is a closed loop it could be finite. Even if time is infinite, that doesn't mean there is no present. We can easily mathematically model a particle x moving along an infinite trajectory such as x = sin(t^2), and the (say) t=3 present exists.
    – causative ♦
    Commented Jul 28 at 5:48
  • Another option rather than the whole universe looping (or infinite time) would be if there's an initial causal loop A -> B -> C -> A, but there's also an offshoot C -> D -> E > F -> ... so that the universe begins with a causal loop and then continues with linear time. Many options for how it could be.
    – causative ♦
    Commented Jul 28 at 7:34
  • @causative I didn't understand what you mean about time being a "closed loop", to be fair. About time being infinite, how do you explain the present, then? Suppose we're in a time t + 1. Time started in t, so it needed to go through one second to reach us. But it's infinite, then it already existed in t - 1; therefore, it passed through 2 seconds. The same would lead us to the fact time already was in t - 5000; that would make 5001 seconds to reach the present etc.; it'd pressuppose an infinite time passing so we can have a present. This doesn't make sense.
    – Choi
    Commented Jul 28 at 7:43

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