Does the denial of epiphenomenalism involve positing more hard problems?

Question

Suppose that consciousness is somehow causally efficacious and causes events in the physical world (I.e. the denial of epiphenomenalism which states that consciousness plays no causal role). If it is also generated from physical processes, we now have two hard problems:

a) the original hard problem of consciousness: how exactly do physical processes generate consciousness?

b) the reverse hard problem (I suppose one half of the interaction problem?) : how do conscious processes affect the physical?

Denying epiphenomenalism means that you now have two hard problems. Affirming it means you only have one. Thus, you have less unexplained posits when affirming epiphenomenalism and there is nothing that you lose out on with respect to explanatory power. After all, the denier has not offered any sort of explanation for how a conscious process translates into physical effects (and it may even be in principle impossible similar to the original hard problem). And so how can one reasonably argue that consciousness helps explain anything physical?

Now, affirming it still keeps the original hard problem of consciousness but we atleast have evidence that consciousness a) exists and b) relies upon the physical even if we don’t understand how (or if there could even be a further how to explain).

For example, we have plenty of evidence showing that inanimate objects are likely not conscious. We have periods of existence without consciousness (during sleep) and we presume by analogy that dead people are also not conscious. Thus, we have some evidence that is explained better by consciousness depending on and being generated by physical processes.

So, if epiphenomenalism results in fewer unexplained posits without losing explanatory power, does this not give a reason as per Occam’s razor to prefer it?

Answer 1

If epiphenomenalism results in fewer unexplained posits without losing explanatory power, does this not give a reason as per Occam’s razor to prefer it?

No. (1) The denial of epiphenomenalism does not necessarily create two distinct problems. Assuming there is a "hard problem of explaining consciousness", that is, a problem of how consciousness "arises" out of physical processes, then - if there is a theory that explains that adequately, then that very same theory will (or should) also explain the reverse, namely, "how consciousness causally impacts the material world" (or whichever way you want to express that).

(2) In your formulation, "the hard problem of consciousness" appears to only be a problem when epiphenomenalism is denied. This leaves open the question whether or not there is any "hard problem" of consciousness in epiphenomenalism. It's not necessary to assume there is one. (Also, if there is one, it would be a completely different kind of problem then in non-epiphenomenalistic views.)

Anyway, if there is no problem, then, from an epiphenomenalist point of view, that could be seen as the Ultimate Occam's Razor (the problem evaporated -- poof, gone! -- which is preferable to still believing there is some problem), but this would have to be argued for separately. A problem doesn't just disappear by being declared to be no problem. (Which is also what you appear to be doing, even if for the rest your whole argument would be sound.)

On the other hand, if there is a problem in an epiphenomenalist point of view, then clearly it is not the problem what "causes" consciousness to happen. Strictly speaking, there is no "cause" for consciousness -- at least not according to an epiphenomenalist point of view.

Good questions would be "Why is it that sentience developed in certain animals?", "What criteria can be used to determine if certain animals are sentient or not?", "What kinds of sentience can we distinguish?" -- The mystery of consciousness is not really a feeling of mystery about consciousness or acute self-awareness, it's a feeling of mystery about sentience.

It's unfortunate that philosophers have made an awful, confused mess out of the notion of epiphenomenalism, starting with Broad, in Mind and its Place in Nature (1925), who wrote "x is epiphenomenal" means "x is an effect but itself has no effects in the physical world whatsoever". Dennett, in Consciousness Explained (1991) thrashes (and trashes) that notion (in the chapter "Qualia Disqualified"):

[T]he philosophical meaning is too strong, it yields a notion of no utility whatsoever.

He distinguishes it from the original, useful, non-philosophical sense, as used by Huxley, referring to events or behaviors that are (to be considered) as "mere byproducts", "side-effects" that play no functional role in the actual process that we're interested in (and thus should have no role in any explanation of that process). Example: Biting your lips when you're thinking very hard.

My criticism would be not that it has no utility, but rather that Broad's definition is incoherent. It's impossible for something to exist in the physical world and have no effects whatsoever. This is an incoherent use of the word "effect". Being observed or being in a gravity field means having effects. The only "thing" that could have no effects would be the world-ending singularity of the Big Crunch (if that were to happen and assuming this would not itself be a new Big Bang).

But Dennett's criticism in this context seems to overlook that epiphenomenalism can also be construed as stating that mental processes can be described either as purely physical processes (synapses, activation potentials) or as information-processing processes. I believe what makes this confusing is that consciousness (or sentience) is very real (as we all know), but that the unity of consciousness, the unity and "immediacy" of experience, its "luminosity" -- all that which convinced Descartes that the mind exists, is indivisible and therefore not physical -- is an illusion (or rather: it's something constructed and to be explained, similar to perceptual constancies being constructed).

Answer 2

If all biological efforts to govern action are generated by the unconscious body, and there is no feedback from the conscious body back into the efforts of the body, then epiphenomenalism would be true, and the conscious concern called the hard problem would be caused exclusively by the unconscious body. All efforts to ask and answer such questions would have to map to some unconscious states in the human body. This is what the psychologist William James called medical materialism. If medical materialism is true then all questions or claims in the conscious discussion reduce to material causes and that would explain the hard problem as no problem at all it is just an illusion!

Answer 3

I'd rather be a free individual with two problems than a meat puppet with one. This said, there are many additional problems raised by epiphenomenalism:

1. How come we can notice our conscious thoughts, if they aren't causal?
2. Why do conscious thoughts even exist, if they provide no Darwinian advantage?
3. Why bother advancing any philosophical argument, if arguments are just meaningless noise?

Epiphenomenalism must be the most ridiculous idea ever to cross one's mind. An idea that denies the importance of ideas denies itself.