Dilly is critiquing Hasker because he considers Hasker's view to undercut most of the rationale for dualism. Hasker is implicitly accepting a weak version of Identity Theory -- in that an emergent mind will appear whenever a physical structure that can generate its emergence exists. This basically makes mind "identical" with is substrate, initially. Hasker contradictorily assumes that mind can then be causally independent of its substrate -- breaking his initial "identity" assumption is essential for minds to have libertarian freedom, and radical unity.
I think the problem that Dilley is concerned about is that Hasker's argument can be used without his causal independence, to simply argue for straightforward Identity Theory. And as his radical version of causal independence is the most problematic part of his model, ditching it is what all materialists would advocate.
Hasker assumes that Kim's pairing problem is an actual problem, and that conservation of energy of the entire physical universe is proven -- and is trying to come up with a solution to both. However, since Newton, causation is not assumed to require "same types" of things, and interactive dualists have come up with multiple answers to the conservation of energy "problem". Hasker is trying to address non-issues.