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Started reading Spinoza's Ethics 2 days ago, and it has gone well so far. However, even with its definition at the start of Book II, I struggle to understand Spinoza's use of singular things in propositions after prop. 8.

In most of the demonstrations he uses argumenation along the lines of "Singular things are not in god's essence as they are not infinite, and hence neither in the essence of his attributes (as they are also their own cause and have necessary existence). Therefore man doesn't have necessary existence being a singular thing" However, I don't quite understand how singular things can still be, aka. be in god.

My confusion: Since modes are affects of god's attributes they must exist and be infinite. However, can a mode of a mode, or affect of a mode that is infinite be finite since the mode isn't a direct link of substance/god? Is that how singular things come to be? But since god is all encompassing, why aren't these then in his essence, and then have to be necessarily infinite and existant? How can they be "outside" god if god is the only substance, aka. all that is?

Clearly I'm getting something wrong, so any help would be appreciated!

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  • See Appendix to Bk.I: "In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one : that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature ; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so ; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived ; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. "
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 22, 2022 at 7:35
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    Thus, individual things (particulars) are in God as modes: Def.v "By mode, I mean the modifications of substance", and Prop. xxviii. "Every individual thing, ... But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God ; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; 1/2
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 22, 2022 at 7:41
  • for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God." 2/2
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 22, 2022 at 7:41
  • See e.g. Identity and Distinction in Spinoza's Ethics for Spinoza's substance monism.
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 22, 2022 at 7:54
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    See also Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics: Finite modes: "What about finite things like furniture and people? [...] This is a notoriously difficult question facing Spinoza’s metaphysics, one that was raised by Leibniz just a year after Spinoza’s death (Leibniz 1969, 203). [...] How can Spinoza believe both that God is the cause of all things and that finite things follow only from other finite things?"
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Commented Dec 22, 2022 at 8:51

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I think your confusion is between finite modes/ideas and infinite modes/ideas.

Finite modes and ideas are those that are perceived by the limited human mind. These are the ones that become particular. In becoming particular, they 'lose' God's essence of infiniteness.

Infinite modes and ideas are those that exist in potentiality i.e. in God's pure essence. These are the ones that stay infinite.

Both finite and infinite are within God.

The main difference is that the finite is not infinite and so is not in the true essence of God, though it is still within God.

https://www.superphysics.org/research/spinoza/simple-ethics/part-2/propositions-07-08/

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