Heidegger describes an inversion of meaning of realitas objectiva from Descartes and Scholasticism to Kant and modernism (depending on your subscription), in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Chapter One Kant's Thesis: Being Is Not A Real Predicate p. 37–38.
[Kant] separates objective reality as actuality from possibility. If I
devise or invent some possible thing, then in doing so I am occupied
with this imagined thing's pure relationships having real content,
though without thinking of the thing with these relations as being
actual, presently existent. In retrospect, this use of reality occurs
also in Descartes. Descartes says, for instance, that error, and in
general everything that has negative value, everything malum, non esse
quid reale, is nothing.11 This does not mean that error does not
actually exist; instead, error is surely actual, but it and everything
evil and bad is not a res in the sense that it would be an independent
real content for itself. It is always only advenient and it is only
by means of the negation of an independent real content, by the
negation of the good. Similarly in the proof for God's existence in
the third meditation, when he is speaking of realitas objectiva and
realitas actualis, Descartes here, too, takes realitas in the sense
mentioned above—the sense of realness or res-ness, German
Sachheit—equivalent to the Scholastic quidditas [whatness,
somethingness]. Realitas objectiva is not identical with the Kantian
objective reality but just the opposite. In Descartes realitas
objectiva means, following Scholasticism, the objectified what, which
is held over against me only in pure representation, the essence of a
thing. Realitas objectiva equals possibility, possibilitas. In
contrast, what corresponds to the Kantian concept of objective
reality, or actuality, is the Cartesian and Scholastic concept of
realitas actualis—the what which is actualized (actu). This noteworthy
distinction between the Cartesian concept of realitas objectiva as
tantamount to subjectively represented possibility and the Kantian
concept of objective reality, or that which is in itself, is connected
with the fact that the concept of the objective [Objektive] was turned
into its exact opposite during this period. The objective, namely,
that which is merely held over against me, is in Kantian and modern
language the subjective. What Kant calls the subjective is for the
Scholastics that which lies at the basis, hupokeimenon, the objective,
thus corresponding to the literal sense of the expression "subject."
- Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, Latin-German edition (Felix Meiner, 1959). Meditation 4, p. 100.
Ens realissimum is mentioned earlier on page 37 and on page 148.