Is the uptake in grounding-talk, in modern analytic metaphysics, a carryover from the notion of a ground-state in physics?

Question

The SEP article on metaphysical grounding says of the history of the topic:

There are interesting and difficult questions about grounding, its history, and what its relationship to the history of philosophy is. On one view, the notion of grounding is old, perhaps as old as philosophy itself, with many of its most important thinkers engaging with questions related to grounding. On another view, the notion of grounding is decidedly new—it’s a recent development in contemporary analytic metaphysics. ... Ultimately, however, it seems that the “Is grounding old or new?” question should give way to nuanced and text-based discussions of structural similarities and causal continuities between specific thinkers. As this entry will make clear, contemporary figures don’t fully agree on the concept of grounding. Hence, it seems that there is little to be gained by asking whether thus-and-so historical figures used the same notion as the contemporary figures, as the contemporary figures aren’t using the same notion themselves!

Both that SEP entry and the one on fundamentality have sections about well-foundedness.^E And there is not so much difference between, "A is the foundation of B," "A grounds B," and, "A is fundamental to B." The appearance of the old-or-new question turns, it seems, on an uptake in the use of the word "grounding" in this context, then. Was this because of analytic philosophy's "romantic relationship with" science? Like, from talk of electricity being grounded to talk of ground states in quantum physics, or even grounding-talk in set theory, do we have the newfangled inspiration for analytic philosophy to start obsessing over the word "grounding"?

Or, to be less mean about it: is there an indispensability argument from grounding-talk in science to grounding-talk in metaphysics, and this argument (subconscious or not) is what explains/justifies analytic philosophy's peculiar concern for this terminology?

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^EIt might be objected that the SEP articles in question do prise apart grounding-talk from the scheme of well-foundation. However, drop the "well-" part and then nothing else is lost to the equation of, "A grounds B," and, "B is founded upon A." For if this were not so, then we would not distinguish, "A is unfounded," from, "A is ill-founded"; so likewise, we can distinguish between talk of being grounded in general, and talk of being well-grounded more specifically (and this latter seems equivalent to well-foundation).

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EDIT 2: in quantum physics, the ground state is a vacuum, and the dependence of the nature of the world on this being a true or false/stable or unstable (metastable?) vacuum is such that they say that the laws of physics would be transformed by a false-vacuum collapse. So it is as if to say that the world is grounded in, or founded upon, the "void." If Heideggerian grounding-talk is also at stake, then what overlap there is between the image of quantum vacua and "Being and Nothing" might not be slight.

Answer 1

If Etymonline's article on 'grounding' is to be believed, 'grounding' as a term for arguments goes back to the 14th century with potential roots back into Old English. From the article:

mid-13c., "to put on the ground, to strike down to the ground;" late 14c., "lay the foundation of," also, figuratively, "to base" (an argument, sermon, etc.), from ground (n.). Meaning "instruct thoroughly in the basics" is from late 14c. Of ships, "to run into the ground," from mid-15c. (intransitive), transitive sense from 1650s. Of arms, from 1711. Electrical sense from 1881. Meaning "deny privileges" is 1940s, originally a punishment meted out to pilots (in which sense it is attested from 1930). In the sense "establish firmly" Old English had grundweallian, grundstaðelian; also gryndan "descend," gegryndan "to found."

Clearly, an electrical ground state comes 400 years after the sense we use in philosophy. I would suggest this makes sense because "laying the foundation of an argument" is a metaphor for the beginning stages of building an edifice or structure and thus is metaphorical. Intuitively, grounding of meaning or argument appeals to the intuitions that a building without a good foundation will not stand, quite literally.

For instance, Robert Audi makes deliberate and extensive use of the metaphor in several of his works. In particular, The Architecture of Reason (GB) (one of my go-to's on rationality) he explicitly discusses the metaphor. He then goes on to explain the core tenets of the theory he presents in the first two chapters before moving forward. Thus, any similarities drawn that exceed this notion of metaphor would seem to be from commonalities between electrical thinking and architectural thinking, or stem from a very imaginative brain, conceivability being an important skill in philosophy naturally.

Thus, from your own citation:

Ultimately, however, it seems that the “Is grounding old or new?” question should give way to nuanced and text-based discussions of structural similarities and causal continuities between specific thinkers.

Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to in specific cases, consider certain hair-splitters may directly be inspired by QM in the development of their idiolect. Such claims, however, would not apply in the general case, as it seems the intuitive power of the metaphor is a much more likely motivation for use, and that any specific claims for any specific thinker would need to be supported with historical evidence.

Answer 2

Ground states in QM are simply minimum energy states, so there isn't, as far as I can see, a literal or metaphoric link with the use of the word 'ground' to mean the justification or basis for an argument or a belief. Ground, in the QM sense, just means as low as you can go.