I was reading that properly basic beliefs are beliefs that are either self-evidently true, evident to the senses or incorrigible. The general example given for incorrigible beliefs is "beliefs I cannot be wrong about, like reporting on what seems true to us, since we cannot be wrong about what seems true to us." An example would be, "I have a headache," or Descartes' statement, "I think, therefore, I am."

My question is twofold: What are other examples of incorrigible basic beliefs, and how are incorrigible basic beliefs justified in being true by default? It is obvious that we can be mistaken concerning what seems true to us, so how can something that seems to be true to us be automatically true when simultaneously it may be false, assuming we have not come to realize that our perception is false? In other words, suppose that at least one of our incorrigible beliefs is actually false prior to our realizing that it is false. Then prior to our realizing that it is false, the belief by definition is true. But in reality, the belief is actually false, so in that moment prior to our realizing that it is false, the belief has two truth values assigned to it, which is contradictory. How can we make sense of incorrigible beliefs then? Maybe it actually has only one truth value assigned to it as dictated from the reality that it is false, so even though it is perceived as being true, it is actually false. Regardless, how is it that incorrigible beliefs are immediately true? Is it true in a subjective sense then? I'm sorry for the rambling.


(too long for a comment)

The logic in your second paragraph misses the point. Assume "I believe that ripe bananas are yellow". It is a properly basic belief that "I hold that 'I believe that ripe bananas are yellow'". Note the second level of indirection. The sensation of believing something just comes to oneself as a subjective experience. Since this "sensation of believing" is a subjective, internal experience, it is (or at least appears to be) on the same kind of footing as having as other internal, subjective experiences, e.g. perceptual ones.

Whether or not there are bananas out there in the world that aren't yellow when ripe doesn't change the fact that, in my current mental state, it is true that "I believe that ripe bananas are yellow".

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