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Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard (ie made it up) it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

edited for clarity

Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

Let's take the open question argument to basically be that if we tried to provide a reductive definition of (e.g.) goodness in non-non-naturalistic terms (so naturalistic terms), we can always nevertheless ask/doubt whether said (non-non-)naturalistic definition of goodness was such that upon its criteria being satisfied we could say both that those criteria were satisfied and that that's what goodness amounts to (in a sort of biconditional relation).

I have heard (ie made it up) it said that G.E. Moore, who came up with this argument, eventually rejected the open question argument. I can't find a citation for such anywhere. So where (in what text) and on what basis did Moore reject the argument, if he even did?

Note: I don't think the open question argument, as charitably understood as possible, makes much room for non-naturalism since we can always press on how we got extensionality without knowing what criteria constitute the intensionality of a moral predicate.

edited for clarity