There are many questions on this site about subjective probabilities, epistemic probabilities, assigning probabilities/credences to hypotheses, bayesian reasoning, etc. The following are just a few examples:
- Are epistemic probability and empirical probability comparable?
- Can objective epistemic probabilistic comparisons be established between metaphysical worldviews?
- Can probability amplitudes be used as credences?
- Is it irrational to assign a probability to a metaphysical proposition?
- How does one argue for the rationality of assigning subjective probabilities in the context of Pascal’s Wager?
- Is it valid to calculate the probability of different metaphysical realities?
- Does a 100% degree of belief imply that no amount of evidence can change your mind?
- Does the Bayesian degree of belief system result in absurd conclusions?
If epistemic probabilities are real, they must exist somewhere. Under physicalism, they would presumably have to correspond to physical states in the brain. Even under alternative metaphysical views, such as dualism, epistemic probabilities would still require some kind of physical counterpart—unless they are somehow stored in the "spiritual" or "immaterial mind."
Do epistemic probabilities exist?