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Qualia refers to the phenomenal character of subjective experience.

4 votes

Illusionists about qualia: how?

There is an important difference between qualia and Father Christmas which Dennett foolishly overlooks: viz, there is a convincing and vastly more plausible alternative explanation for why presents appear … expectation, however, is that we will find that the difference between the illusionists and the rest of us actually boils down to just a difference in labelling- they use the word illusion where we use qualia
Professor Sushing's user avatar
1 vote

Are sensations mind dependent?

To some extent, yes, sensations are mind dependent- but not to the extent that the entire world is mind-dependent. For example, we know that some people are colour-blind, tone-deaf and so on, so there …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
0 votes

Along the lines of the concept of the inverted spectrum, can it be that musical pitch percep...

Firstly, the relationship between colours and notes in music is not as remarkable as you suggest, being only weakly analogous at best. In our perception of light, there is nothing analogous to an octa …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
1 vote

Would the alleged nonexistence of qualia imply that it is meaningless to say that what I cal...

No, regardless of what theories any philosopher might put forward to explain our sense impressions- whether you consider them to be illusions, hypotheses, qualia, incoherent concepts etc- the fact remains …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
1 vote

How plausible is it that every decohered entity has qualia, which merge into functional units?

Leaving aside the fact that you would have to elaborate what you envisage when you talk about small inanimate objects having qualia (the spellchecker changed that to quail, by the way, which is a bit annoying …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
5 votes

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

You say that the first para of the SEP article include the words "[Zombies] are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences". Clearly the 'but' implies that we (ie human …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
0 votes

According to Chalmers, can neuroscience resolve the "hard problem of consciousness"?

I suggest you consider one aspect of consciousness, such as colour perception. Take the colour red, for example. The quality of the mental experience you have of the colour red has no explanation in p …
Professor Sushing's user avatar
3 votes
Accepted

How do we know if our interpretation of our raw conscious experiences is accurate?

Perhaps a useful notion here is calibration. With other types of sensors, such as thermometers, ammeters, odometers, and so on, a degree of confidence in their readings can be obtained by comparison w …
Professor Sushing's user avatar