7

Yes, a nominalist logician can do so, and even preserve classical logic and while denying existence of both abstract objects and universals. What gives? A nominalist changes the standard semantics instead, how truth values are assigned to predicates and quantifiers. Traditional assignment formalized by Tarski in 1936 requires a universe of objects with ...


5

I don't think there is a problem for nominalists here. I take nominalism to be the view that there are only individuals or particulars - concrete things or signs of concrete things, particular objects, states and events in space/time. My own death is, or will be, an individual event in space/time. What it will not be is an instance of a universal, namely ...


3

All people, nominalist as well as realists, can believe in: One day, I will die. Or more general, they can believe in: One day in his future, each living being will die. That's the most simple hypothesis about our future. No case is known which contradicts the hypothesis. Instead billions of cases from experience support the hypothesis. In addition, ...


3

Mr. Jensen, the problem of universals is usually a heavily obfuscated issue. So, pardon me if my post gets too long because it, since the problem of universals cannot be encountered, without clearing up a few more issues. We have on one side the contradiction between e.g. the general or abstract “(being) yellow” vs “yellow things”. Most people would ...


2

Consider unemployment and its caus(es): one stated simple cause might be that poverty in general is responsible, and a counter-position is that every person has the ability to find employment and prosperity. Here we have an abstract concept (within a causal relationship) opposed to properties in all individuals (considered in the example). Would you accept ...


2

C. S. Peirce* defines nominalism vs. realism (which I think you mean by "universalist") very well (CP 1.27 fn): It must not be imagined that any notable realist of the thirteenth or fourteenth century took the ground that any “universal” was what we in English should call a “thing,” as it seems that, in an earlier age, some realists and some ...


2

We could go through the permutations of Platonism, nominalism, intuitionism, empiricism, and fictionalism. The guts of the question is whether, if Platonism is true, we can and do discover mathematical truths. Platonism is very roughly the view that 'there is a realm of mind-independent mathematical objects (sets, numbers) whose properties mathematicians ...


2

Mark Balguer's Platonism and Anti-Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics is considered a critical text arguing that the ontology of mathematical objects is an open question such that there are perhaps equally good arguments on both sides for mutually exclusive positions.


2

No. The nominalist position is that a name is only a name and does not express any "deeper" reality about what it names. A cat obviously "is" many things, a mammal, a carnivore, an awfully cute critter with retractible claws that licks itself clean. And, as famously described in philosophy, an animal that is sometimes on a mat. To a nominalist, the name "cat"...


2

Well, the following extract from the SEP on the problem of universals: it is customary to classify medieval authors as being realists, conceptualists, or nominalists, respectively. The realists are supposed to be those who assert the existence of real universals in and/or before particular things, the conceptualists those who allow universals only, or ...


2

Of course, their only difference is how they define the word "exists". If two equal saints meet and argue about something, most likely u should bet they're both honest, smart and wise guy, just confused about each other's definition. This universal confusion caused so many unnecessary conflicts throughout history. As Socrates once hinted that ...


2

See the SEP article on nominalism: [T]here are (at least) two kinds of Nominalism, one that maintains that there are no universals and one that maintains that there are no abstract objects. Realism about universals is the doctrine that there are universals, and Platonism is the doctrine that there are abstract objects. So there definitely is a difference. ...


2

One way to express the concept of half-life without math is to fill a see-through container with pennies, marking their volume on the side with a horizontal line. Shake the container and then spread them out on a flat surface, removing all pennies that landed tails-up. Then return the remaining heads-up pennies back to the container. Mark the volume again (...


1

See English transl of Lives, Book VII (Stoics), 54 : "The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object – according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics [...] while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and ...


1

In sciences, such situation has been encountered where the set of experimental data leads to a variety of conclusions and the analyst has to sieve through the data with background disposition as to his seemingly 'subjective choice' but a choice based on the history of such investigations. In selecting/choosing commodity prices - such biases do work. When a ...


1

Yes, it is a type of nominalism. Realism with respect to some noun "X" asserts that "X exists" or "X is real". Nominalism asserts that " 'X' is just a name, but does not 'exist' or is not 'real' ". Thus, by asserting that numbers do not exist, one is asserting nominalism with respect to numbers, hence, one is asserting ...


1

Building off of @Conifold 's comment, here is a list of SEP articles which seem to contain contemporary off-shoots of the original "Problem of Universals". If anyone has a suggestion to add to the list, that would be awesome! Abstract Objects Types and Tokens Tropes Nominalism in Metaphysics Platonism in Metaphysics Properties Objects Ontic ...


1

Well, it is, as you say, concise. And accurate, I believe. Perhaps uselessly so. From Protagoras' "man is the measure of all things" to "naming" in Genesis to Locke's modern nominalism and, finally, to the nominalism of Ayer and the "now-called-naive" positivists, the idea that our shared knowledge is inevitably linguistic and conventional has many ...


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