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I answer with the authority of being a native German speaker and having graduated in philosophy ;) Back-world is a bad translation here. Presumably, the translator has mistaken the term "Hinterweltler" as being a misspelling and semantically identical to the word "Hinterwäldler", which means backwoodsmen or hillbillies. The German original "Hinterwelt" ...


4

I think this question is conflating a few different levels of analysis. 'Being' in the sense of sein or dasein, which is usually taken to mean the peculiar nature of life (or human life in the latter case): i.e., very roughly equivalent to conscious experience. 'Being' in the ontological sense of material existence: i.e., it has physical form, therefore it ...


3

Welcome, Joedean7. You ask a a question about other philosophers in the heading, then switch to your own argument. I have made a choice and addressed the latter. I offer a counter-argument. If physical phenomena are illusory than presumably the relevant illusions occur to a non-physical phenomenon, whatever that might be. Something has to have - to ...


3

Edward Feser, speaking in the context of the philosophy of mind regarding arguments between dualism and materialism, claims that the "positivist" view that the OP presents is common and is indeed a misunderstanding of philosophical argumentation. (page 234) A related misunderstanding - and this time, one that even many philosophers are prone to - is to ...


2

Whether or not a subset is considered an element of the superset is a metaphysical presupposition in your set theory. In naive set theory, the relationship between sets as elements is not clear, because often the context treats elements and sets as objects and containers through conceptual metaphor. As such, certain implications arise from having containers ...


2

We have the concept "car" : an abstract (an universal), and we have individual cars : the objects (the particulars). Individual cars fall under the general car concept. If we assume the existence of the set of all cars (an abstract : the extension of the concept), an individual car is an element of the set of all cars. The concept car is subsumed into ...


2

'Idealism' is a porous term and I don't think any hard and fast correct answer is possible to your question. Highly provisionally I offer the following response. Objective idealism Take 'idealism' to be the view that ultimate reality is non-physical. It is generally assumed, though I have reservations, that this implies that it is mental. Subjective ...


2

Welcome to SE Philosophy! From (SEP: Existence): We can trace the issue of whether existence is a property to a disagreement between the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle and some of his medieval followers over the relationship between an individual's essence and its existence. The question you pose goes back to at least Aristotle, and is metaphysical ...


2

Philosophical galvanism (as opposed to the empirical study of electricity in animal tissues) was a peculiar form of vitalism. While vitalism in general was quite popular and influential in the late 18th-19th century, this particular variation was not. Galvani himself soon abandoned references to élan vital, and after Volta's pile vitalists mostly did not ...


2

According to WP, Hegel is a proponent of absolute idealism. To wit: It is Hegel's account of how being is ultimately comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole (das Absolute). Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its object (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an identity of ...


2

Welcome, James 1. Parfit and the non-reductionist view of personal identity Parfit rejects the idea that personal identity - continuity and survival over time - involves the continued existence of any irreducible persistent entity such as the Cartesian Ego. On the contrary, personal identity is reducible to continuities - similarities between Derek Parfit ...


1

Welcome, Sam Wheel. In philosophy aporia retains, at least standardly, its Aristotelian sense. This has no commonality with zen so far as I can see if by 'beginner's mind' we mean what Suzuki does: So the most difficult thing is always to keep your beginner's mind... Even though you read much Zen literature, you must read each sentence with a ...


1

Because, to my absolute surprise, no one has asked this question before, I would like to elaborate a bit and summarize the most well-known versions* of idealism, as well as popular protagonists of different views, for reference to other questions that may come. *David Chalmers, in one of his famous articles "Idealism and the mind-body problem", divides the ...


1

It is quite possible that connections between Hegel's Absolute Idealism and (some sense of) realism can be drawn out. But there is a fundamental divide between the two in the or a standard sense of 'realism'. It develops as follows. Realism in most forms assumes the existence of a mind-independent world of which we can have knowledge. So for realism, mind ...


1

The question is to decide if the following two descriptions refer to objects or not: The second usage of things, as in, each thing has usually a defined usage, but sometimes people use things in a second way which is not exactly the intended purpose of the creation of that thing, e.g. bending a piece of paper and using it as a funnel. The contents of ...


1

Here are the questions: So what's the difference between a second-order relation and a relation between objects? Is it related to second-order logic and could you explain so that a layman can understand? A first-order logic has a domain, such as the natural numbers. Relations of first-order logic relate one or more objects of this domain. If there is ...


1

Yes, of course, every comprehensive philosophy is a set of such answers, but agreement is not a valid criterion to choose among them. Consensus is relevant in science because of the scientific methods, where repeatability of an experiment produces a scientific consensus. Philosophy does not have the same luxury of a well structured epistemic framework (and ...


1

There are well-endorsed answers for all these questions but you will not find them in the academic philosophy of our universities, as is indicated by the answers and comments here. The question of whether there are any widely agreed answers is easily answerable by pointing to the widespread agreement on their answers in the Perennial tradition. Regrettably, ...


1

Now, can anyone tell which, if any, of these question has found an answer (meaning an answer agreed by [almost] everyone) and who was the author? "Almost everyone" is a very ambiguous term. It's tough to see explicit agreement on metaphysical principles because many people never consider them, but go about their business thinking without thinking about ...


1

The Wikipedia article on ontology that the OP cites notes that answers have been provided but they may not have been accepted by others: Various philosophers have provided different answers to these questions. This should be enough to answer the main question: Now, can anyone tell which, if any, of these question has found an answer (meaning an answer ...


1

Philosophy and science should not be confused. In philosophy something may be proven or demonstrated. As Edward Feser puts it (page 235), philosophical arguments are more like (though of course not exactly like) the proofs of geometry than they are like the probabilistic hypotheses put forward in empirical science. One could, of course, try to show that ...


1

I'll mention a criticism which derives from Leibniz. There is not total disagreement between Spinoza and Leibniz on necessitarianism but their views irreducibly diverge as we cut deeper. In my view Leibniz's critique amounts to a major and sound criticism. Spinoza One of the supporting pillars of Spinozas system is the idea that the world does not ...


1

IMO one should not play off one against the other, i.e. geometry against arithmetic or vice versa. At the time of Poincaré both disciplines were separated. At the base of Grothendieck‘s revolutionary view onto Algebraic Geometry lies the concept of the spectrum: Introducing the spectrum Spec R of a commutative ring R means to consider the algebraic object ...


1

In all modern references the terms are synonymous except in music. Discordant harmony in music refers to a harmony created by discordant notes - notes which do not fall in the same chord. This is also called dissonance. Frank L. Huntley discusses Dr. Johnson's lexical ambiguity in the The Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 2, in an ...


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