11

The answer is controversial. Hume, 18th century British philosopher, famously argued that such a possibility is conceivable, that if we are presented with a spectrum of color where some intermediate shade is missing we will be able to imagine the missing shade, even if we never saw it before. Here is Hume's missing shade of blue thought experiment: "...


10

A halluncination is to have a perception in the awake state when there is no external stimulus. Colour is not a halluncination. Instead, it is the result of our processing of visual stimuli in the mind, see e.g., my answer to the previous question Is color intrinsic to light? Analogously, hearing tones is the result of our processing of auditive stimuli ...


5

"there are no facts, its our perception" is a very strange claim. For a start, is this claim a fact? If it is a fact, i.e. if it is true, then there are no facts. But if it is a fact, then there is at least one fact, namely this one, so it is not true to say 'there are no facts'. So it is not a fact. Generally, it's a logical fallacy to argue from (1) S ...


5

Berkeley gives two arguments in the quoted passage, and the first one does resonate with Kant's later arguments. But Berkeley's came before Kant's. First, he says that the notion of matter is "inconsistent". This is roughly because it is usually defined in terms of attributes (extension, color, sound, etc.), which only make sense as perceived (by their ...


5

I think the sticking point here is, as you point out, the immediateness of qualia. But that's not actually taken for granted in the literature. In the physicalism vs. anti-materialism debate in philosophy of mind, there's a proposal called the Qualitative Inaccuracy Hypothesis (QI), essentially that we are mistaken about our own qualia (for example, we're ...


5

David Chalmers takes the reasoning you describe and flips on its head: Levels of complexity can never account for the purely ontological nature of consciousness (his famous "hard-problem of consciousness"), and therefore if physicalism is true, then consciousness must be fundamental, i.e. it has to be a basic property of matter like electrical charge or mass....


5

Sounds like Sampling Bias to me. Andy's mental sample of gay men is more likely to include flamboyant ones than non-flamboyant ones, leading to overrepresentation of flamboyant men in the sample.


5

See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding : Book II, Chapter VIII by John Locke. Primary qualities of bodies. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, First, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be ; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps ; and ...


4

The original story (the dream about the butterfly) is from the writings of Chuang Tzu (also transliterated as Zhuangzi) who was a significant early Taoist philosopher noted for a mischievous sense of humor and cynical outlook. You might look into his works as a starting point. As @Dog mentioned, Descartes' famous Meditations takes dreams as a major subject....


4

Pasnau calls this the "content fallacy", quoting Pylyshyn's alternative description of it as "the seemingly innocent scope slip that lakes image of object X with Property P to mean (image of object X) with property P instead of the correct image of (object X with property P)". He gives some examples of it in Aquinas and the Content Fallacy. It is easy to see ...


4

If I am correct, you asked if, as humans, we can always find a new question for which we do not know the answer. This means that there will never be a human that knows the answer to any question he/she can ask. I think that the answer is yes. For example, you can always ask, what is the next prime number? If your question is about the number of question ...


4

We have scientific understanding of a lot that is relevant to color perception, not only wavelengths but also of photoreceptors, how they relate to color blindness, etc. But the subjective experience of color perception is perhaps the most common example used when talking about qualia, the what it is like of an experience. There are various arguments as ...


3

Causality is one pattern. You could say that the tiger example of @SwamiVishwananda in your comments states that humans more often are abductive (thinking of a rule intuitively out if a single event that usually is more often right than wrong or where the wrongness is catastrophical, testing it afterwards by the experience of regularities) rather than ...


3

I haven't read your link, but I will explain the two terms in Kant. Regrettably, they are not easy to understand or follow, because they are tightly integrated into Kant's philosophy of mind, which is probably unfamiliar territory and understands the mind in a very different way than your average man on the street. I would suggest you start here with the ...


3

To understand this passage, we have to note that Sartre inherits Husserl's theory of intentionality. For Husserl, all intentional mental states have both a content and an object. I am directed at the object (in this case, the wooden, physical chair) via the content. By contrast, many other theories of intentionality hold that intentionality is a relation ...


3

Good question, except that the answer is worth at least one or two doctoral theses. The question is way above my own amateur level, so perhaps this should just be a comment. However, as far as I understand it, there is fairly good agreement on the ways in which Merleau-Ponty (and nearly all later phenomenologists) broke from many characteristic (and, in my ...


3

Indirect realism in perception is the view that we do not experience the world as how it is, but only through and via our interpretations of how the world is. Representation becomes a key feature of Indirect realism. Consider an object 'a,' and let the image of the object that we perceive be, 'b.' Representation is a resemblance relation, that is, if b ...


3

Yes, you can imagine new "colors", and there are physically meaningful complex colors that humans don't really see. Short version We see with our eyes, and those signals go back to our brains. We ascribe "color" to things that we see as colors are common patterns worth noting and exploiting, e.g. for communication. Since this question is ...


3

It seems trivial to imagine something that is almost like blue, but different. Some can even imagine a super-intelligent shade of the colour blue. It does, however, bring up the challenge of defining what a "color" is. Pick the wrong definition, and you find it mathematically impossible for there to be any colors besides the ones we can see. A ...


3

Perhaps not surprisingly, different philosophers disagree. Kant centers aesthetics around the judgement of the viewer. Beardsley focuses on the artistic experience. Danto considers aesthetic quality to be a function of social context. Bell focused on formal properties of the art object. Art is a subject with very little consensus in philosophy.


3

It is indeed both: confirmation bias and survivorship bias. At least it can be interpreted this way. Adding to this it is mainly circular reasoning based on confirmation bias: the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms one's preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. It is a type of cognitive bias and a systematic ...


3

First, let me kill that idea. Anthropologists do not accept the idea that early humans were cave dwellers. While there have been a few groups of people who did, for the most part, caves are not very hospitable environments. They are dark, cold, and wet. A lot of material was found in caves because neanderthals and early anatomically modern humans used these ...


3

Basically, your question concerns the content of perception ("what we perceive"). As explained here, "content" can be understood in two senses, as in "the content of a bucket" or "the content of a story". You seem to imply the first sense in your question, where the content of perception would be "what is in the mind when we perceive something" (you say "...


3

Your definitions of your terms will ultimately decide about the answer, and they are far from clear here. But indeed, your sentiment can be understood as correct: The difference is trivially there (as we can differentiate) and nevertheless cannot be rigorously proven. Let me explain why ... (There are other philosophical positions out there, but I consider ...


2

This is a saying based on the works of René Descartes. He introduces a way of proving things based on the idea that everything that can be doubted is wrong. According to this method your perception could be false, so what you see might not be what is out there. If you are dreaming for example, you see things as well, even your skin color might be different, ...


2

The Munker Illusion: Science and Philosophy by Jack Schwartz http://bioperipatetic.com/the-munker-illusion-science-and-philosophy/ The Munker Illusion is offered as yet another example of a so-called optical ‘illusion’. Illusions have historically been offered as proof that we cannot trust our senses and that all ideas that depend upon sense-perception ...


2

The question is definitely not philosophy, but whatever. I also don't think you're going to get a particularly interesting answer; we spend early childhood being shown a huge array of animals, and we get pretty good at telling when a new object is similar to an animal we've seen before. Most vertebrates have roughly similar structures (eyes, a head, limbs) ...


2

Let's amend the premise by taking "space" out of it:"our acquired knowledge of objects comes to us from having seen them in certain relations to other objects". Space points do not come with labels attached, even when we measure distances they are distances between markings of some sort, not points. And we can easily establish relations between objects ...


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